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Abstract
In Central and Eastern Europe, the presence of the civil sec-
tor has significantly increased since the early 90’s. To help
the fundraising of the nonprofit sector they worked out tax al-
lowances for the affected organisations and for supporters as
well. One of these instruments is the percentage system, where
taxpayers could dispose over 1 or 2 percent of their personal
income.
The author of this paper executed an experimental research
project to explore how the percentage system could inspire altru-
istic behaviour of individuals and whether there is any crowd-
ing out effect of this kind of governmental contribution. The
research is based on experimental research where the supply of
public goods was observed with and without the possibility of
the special form of contributions – the percentage system.
Through the inquiry, groups have been examined through 10
rounds under two different situations to determine the Nash
equilibrium with and without the presence of the percentage sys-
tem. The experimenter’s role (illustrating the role of the govern-
ment) was to multiply and reallocate contributions after being
informed about individuals’ decisions.
Consequently, this experiment showed that the introduction of
the percentage system does not lower significantly the level of in-
dividual contributions from income. Moreover, a little increase
could be observed in the first round of the experiment’s second
part. Other thought-provoking situations occurred through the
process like the difference between the behaviour of men and
women such as their reaction to the new situation.
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1 Percentage Philanthropy
1.1 Introduction of Percentage Laws
The percentage systems as a part of the tax system according
to Wygnansky [22] was initially adopted in the western part of
Europe e.g. in Spain and Italy, but the aim was to allocate funds
to religious aims e.g. churches. In Hungary, the idea of intro-
ducing this system was taken from these countries, but the coun-
try’s religious map is different than that of the above countries’.
Through percentage philanthropy taxpayers of these countries
are allowed to designate a small part of their personal income
to nonprofits. The system was suitable to allocate resources to
NGOs as well, so the 1+1 % system was introduced. However,
examining the system, another aim is plausible: the state low-
ered his presence and subsidy in these fields, so it could be said
that NGOs and religious organisations were pressed towards pri-
vate financing.
The consequences could be different according to the changes
in state’s financial support and the incentives to inspire contri-
butions. Studies [8] show that the state’s contributions toward
nonprofit organisations – like tax benefits – were reduced in the
short term after introducing the percentage system. The measure
of the possible contribution was not big enough to rearrange the
earlier supporting order. Therefore, only other possibilities were
given to people to favour their religion or other initiatives.
The introduction of the new system could be observed from
a different view other than the financial one. For one thing, it
shapes up the relationship between the state and the NGOs as
well as between NGOs and citizens this way providing for a
specific division of labour and as a purpose generate a compet-
itive sector. On the other hand, the system is sustainable under
every kind of political persuasion. Therefore, the status of these
institutions does not change according to the present political
forces, which may enhance the political independence and give
the possibility to establish a stable supporting base.
There are some possible gains for the state that should be
mentioned as well. For example this arrangement is relatively
simple, it could be introduced administratively so the additional
costs are not relevant. On the other hand, it gives the possibility
to taxpayers to take personal decisions that ameliorate the state’s
Percentage philanthropy – an experimental research 332008 16 1
public relations. At the same time, it is presumable that it pos-
itively affects philanthropy by bringing nonprofit organisations
and their function into familiarity.
The beneficiaries of the system are also in an ambiguous sit-
uation. They are able to get some financial support through the
central tax system, but they have to persuade taxpayers that they
are the most convenient ones to be supported by them. There-
fore, civil donors find themselves in a decisive situation. Nev-
ertheless, the possibly attainable sum of money is limited and
is not huge enough to cease their resource gap. For example in
Hungary in 2006 the 47% of the possible NGOs were supported
through the percentage system, but only 0.94% of the sector rev-
enue originated from this source [KSH 2008, APEH 2007].
The main results of the percentages are almost incomprehen-
sible: the public acceptance of these organisations. It means
that NGOs could involve more public support by taking effect
on people’s genuine commitment or unselfishness and could get
support over this possibility as well. Inventive organisations
could use percentage promotions for fundraising and for im-
proving the collection of contributions from their members as
well. Advantageous parameter of the system is that NGOs could
spend this sum of money without restriction in contrast to the
case of funds from institutional donors of clients.
On the other hand, we should mention the negative conse-
quences as well as the phenomenon that NGOs spend more on
1% campaign than they could receive. Alternatively, the com-
petition of nonprofits for the limited resources turns the focus
from the organisations’ mission to the competition. On the other
hand, they had to formulate clear, convincing, uncontroversial
aims to enter for taxpayers’ money. However, different organi-
sations have different possibilities in the contest. Empirical evi-
dence shows that organisations supporting education and health
care attract the majority of funds via the percentage system1 and
the location is a determining factor of taxpayers’ decision2
1.2 Possible Effect of the Extension of the Percentage Sys-
tem
To get a response for the assumption that the extension of the
Percentage System has importance, the most effective method is
to examine the effect of the change of the tax law in Slovakia
in 2004. Here the measure of designation increased from 1% to
2% and companies have also get the chance to dedicate 2% as
a part of the percentage system. At the same time, the number
of organisations registered for percentage contributions raised.
Consequently, the sum received by NGOs from 2003 to 2004
increased enormously from 97 millions SKK to 845 millions
SKK [http://www.rozhodni.sk].
From data mentioned above the conclusion is clear. The ex-
1 In Slovakia the Health care and Education were supported by almost 50%
of the percentage support in 2002 [25] In Hungary it was 62% in the year of
implementation [21]
2 In Slovakia 62,5% of people supported organisation in the region where he
lived according to a survey in 2002 [25].
tension of the system increases the possibly available resources
for nonprofit organisation and raise the number of competitors as
well. Nevertheless, the huge growth of contribution outweighs
the change in beneficiaries, so the possible support for one NGO
is increased as well. To involve companies to this way of grant
was also a notable factor because statistics showed that they as-
signed more than the 90% of possible dedications. On the other
hand, only the increase of the percentage results a rise in the in-
dividuals’ designations, because they augmented their support to
276 millions SKK that is more than double of the contributions
made in 2003.
Whereas it should be mentioned that by extending the possi-
ble and - as it could be expected – the real support of the civil
sector the problems mentioned earlier will not be solved. So
mainly the local and specific activities could achieve smaller or
bigger donations and this way the financial problem of numer-
ous organisation will not be eased.
A possible solution for this problem could be the Hungarian
way, where a new fund, the Hungarian National Civil Fund was
established with the aim to finance the administrative costs of
NGOs. The connection between the Fund and the percentage
system is unique. The Fund gets as much as the taxpayers de-
signed from 1% to nonprofits. The advantage of this invention is
that citizens’ contributions determine only the size of the Fund
but not its direction so equitable distribution could indeed.
The dangers of this system are as notable as the Slovakian
one. First, civil organisations could spend this amount of money
only for their administrative cost therefore it does not help them
to fulfil their missions. Secondly, it could lead to a feeling of
dependence on the state for meeting operating costs through the
Civil Fund while the attainable amount is only a very small share
of the sector’s overall income. Last but not least the problem of
how central allocation - where the Fund decides the factors of
distributing these resources – could be reasonable.
Rose-Ackerman [20] gives a possible solution to augment
contributions. She found that donations could also rise if public
funds give donors better information about charities that receive
their donations. However, the communication of the third sector
improved by this system and it is a remarkable result.
2 Percentage in Practice
2.1 Comparative Perspective
When percentage system is mentioned only the main concept
of the system is definite because according to the country the
legislations are different. Here I would mention only the main
characteristics and differences of them.
The first difference is between the measures of possible do-
nation. In Poland, only 1% of the income tax is the possible
amount of percentage philanthropy but in other countries it is
2%. In the year of introduction it was also 1% in Hungary and
in Romania as well but legislation has changed. Hungarian peo-
ple could give 1% to an NGO and the other 1% to a religious
organisation or to a specific budgetary priority objective of the
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given year. In Romania, only the percentage increased.
There is a difference by having minimum amount of the sup-
port or not. In Poland no limitation is determined while in Hun-
gary the limitation was abolished. In other countries e.g. in
Lithuania a sum about 3 euro is the minimum. The reason for
this could be the financing of administrative cost or in coun-
tries where there is the possibility to distribute the money among
more beneficiaries this rule prevents from the fragmentation of
designations. The latter is only possible in Slovakia and only for
companies, who are also able to give their percentages to NGOs.
In other countries, only individuals are allowed to designate over
the 1%.
Slovakia is also unique in the use of these funds. Here ben-
eficiaries should use the received money by the end of the next
fiscal year. In other countries no time limit is laid down. The
way and time of designation is very various but changes were
also made in recent years based on observations for example in
Poland where in earlier years individuals should calculate and
transfer the money personally. Now the trend is that central tax
offices calculate and transfer the money that makes this process
anonymous.
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Fig. 1. Trend of Individual Contributions
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Fig. 2. Trend of Private Contributions
To regard on the necessary data to fill out the designation
forms the Hungarian system seems to be effective. Here only
the beneficiary’s tax code is necessary on a sheet of paper that
should only be similar to the enclosed paper, and the taxpayer’s
data are necessary on the envelope (name, address, tax num-
ber). In other countries, other maybe unnecessary data - tax
authorities should be acquainted with these data - are asked as
the bank account number of the beneficiary that makes the pro-
cedure complicated and increases the possibility of faulty filled
forms.
2.2 Hungarian Statistics
In Hungary, the percentage system was introduced in 1997
together with many new tax laws and in a restrictive financial
situation. Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show how the private and individual
contributions changed through the years according to the data
of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office. It shows us, that the
share of contribution made by people and companies decreased
from 21.2% to 12.0% within 10 years. At the same time, the
amount given by these economic actors increased by an average
of 32% per year, which is higher than the yearly inflation index.
It means that the third sector’s real revenues increased in the
observed decade and it could be set that the civil sphere presence
recruited in the country.
Looking at the trend of the individual and private contribu-
tions it is obtrusive that while in 1996 contributions are above
the trend line in 1997 those are below. What could be the rea-
son of this phenomenon? As it was mentioned above, the per-
centage system was introduced in 1997 so the question is obvi-
ous whether the new possibility of donation has a crowding out
effect3. To answer this question an experimental research was
made which could maybe explain some elements of individuals’
behaviour with its restricted possibilities.
However, before the public good game other factors should
be analysed. There are opinions that assume that the invention
of the percentage system is convenient to revive the culture of
philanthropy or revive people’s conscience to meet the NGOs
campaigns. On the other hand, some say that giving 1% or 2%
to noble aims is enough and by filling out the statement of des-
ignation they fulfilled their duty so the percentage system acts
as a deputy for the voluntary contributions.
One thing seems to be true. The reputation of nonprofit organ-
isation is augmented thanks to the observed procedure. To sup-
port this statement we shall look around in a concerned country
some days before the deadline of 1% designation. Every kind
of media is full with the promotions of NGOs. They use almost
every kind of publicity: advertisements in journals, in radio, in
television, in the public transport and so on. Nevertheless, not
only have the actors of the third sector attracted attention. Tax
administration offices also make campaigns not only to collect
3 Crowding out effect appears when individual contributions fall as a result
of additional govenmental support.
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taxes but to promote the possibility of contribution. Its potential
and employed method is to make the list of the involved NGOs
available at the homepage of the Office and pronouncing regu-
larly the outcome of the previous years.
Therefore, the drop of contributions toward NGOs could also
be the result of a regressive fiscal policy in 1996. In these years,
governmental expenditures were cut together with social bene-
fits that could also lead to the decrease of charitable giving of
individuals and companies as well. By this experiment, this fac-
tor could be kept out and we could get a more transparent picture
from the introduction of the percentage system in laboratory en-
vironment.
Different but also interesting statistic is the share of people
who dispose the 1%. Fig. 3 indicates that people – who give not
only the percentage contribution but support the third sector in
other ways as well – give the majority of people who dispose the
1% of their income tax (83,4%). Among the others – who do not
designate the 1% - only 66.4% give some kind of contribution
to NGOs. The correlation between the factors is noticeable but
is not strong. It could mean that the share of individuals who
are able to give 1% is low (pensioners could not give it because
they do not pay personal income tax) or among the socially sen-
sitive people the possibility of giving some more money is not
attractive enough.
3 Experimental Research
Besides empirical analyses, researchers of the nonprofit sec-
tor find other possible area to deepen their knowledge on the be-
haviour of philanthropy. By the tools of experimental research,
they have the possibility to observe individual attitudes in lab-
oratory environments. It could help them to exclude those cir-
cumstances that could not be done in empirical research.
Looking at the third sector, experimental researchers were in-
terested in individual behaviour when public good provision was
the main question. In a simple public good experiment students
were asked to invest some money in a group project. A group
included from 2 to more than hundred people [19] but in most
cases 4-5 people. The experimenter collected the contributions,
multiplied it according to a previously given rule and then di-
vided the money among the group. In some cases, no one knew
the individual contributions only the total. This game was mod-
ified through time and the aim of all modification was to an-
swer different aspects of individual behaviour in an environment
where public good provision was in the centre.
Ledyard [18] summarized the major choices made in creating
a public good game. These are:
• the size of a group,
• the gender of players,
• education of the subject,
• face to face game or communication through computer termi-
nals or isolated rooms,
• the amount and form of endowment ,
• whether discussion is allowed and in what form,
• whether contributions are private or public,
• by how much to increase the total contribution,
• how to divide it (in proportion to contribution or to number),
• whether or when to announce the results,
• whether to pay subjects publicly or privately,
• whether to run the procedure once or more times.
When deciding how to build up the public good game the aim
of the research should be regarded. Ledyard [18] differentiated
four main categories:
1 experiments with voluntary contributions mechanism over a
wide range of environments,
2 experiments with a wide range of mechanism over a limited
class of economic environments,
3 experiments with mechanisms in political environments,
4 experiments with applications or policy problems as the fo-
cus.
In this experiment the effects of a new policy are in the focus in
classroom environment over two different situations. The results
could be deduced from the differences of the two part of the
public goods game.
3.1 Public Good Games Experiments
In public good games economists tend to observe the con-
tribution of individuals to public goods under different circum-
stances. We could speak about a simple public good game when
subjects are asked to decide over their cards or money howmuch
they would spend on public goods [10]. The aim is to maximize
the personal earning with the rules that the value of kept cards
differ from the value of cards given to public goods.
Throughout these researches, there are several rounds to ob-
serve the learning process and to give the possibility to the sub-
ject to work out their own strategy. However, we can draw con-
clusion from one round games as well. In these cases learning
process or observation of others’ behaviour is not present. It
is useful when large number of subjects are concerned or the
control of the research’s environment (e.g. discussion) is diffi-
cult. Other variation to play with large group is the computer-
ized game, but in this case, the lack of personal connection could
modify the outcome.
The curiosity of the public goods experiment is that there is
not only one optimal solution. The social optimum is achieved
when everybody contributes all of his money so the maximal
payment is the double of the total asset – if the state double
the contributed sum. On the other hand, individuals could maxi-
mize their utility by giving nothing to public goods but receiving
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Fig. 3. The nature of 1% contributions
shares from the others’ donations. They are called free riders4
and their personal utility is higher than those who contributed
some money. Consequently, both behaviours could be observed
through a public goods game, but generally it could be observed
that people give some money but not the whole to the common
fund.
Therefore, it could be pointed out that contributions are not
inconsistent with economic theory if individuals care sufficiently
about others’ welfare. The egocentric other-regarding prefer-
ences model of Cox and Sadiraj (2007) [6] has an asymmetric
equilibrium that is consistent with typical data from linear pub-
lic good experiments: many subjects contribute zero, and many
make positive contributions that are less than their endowments.
Holt and Laury [10] observed that women contribute less to
the public good than men do. Similarly, Leuthold [10] reported
that women contributed slightly less than men in a classroom
public goods game, although the difference is not significant.
They attracted attention that gender effects may interact with
the social context in which decisions are made. On the other
hand, as Ledyard (1994) summarized what seems to be the con-
sensus of experimentalists about the effect of the gender on the
change in total contributions, as a percent of the efficient level
the gender had no effect.
Ledyard (1994) and Holt (1997) also observed the conse-
quences of repetition. Both authors documented a tendency
for contributions to decline with repetition, and this effect was
strong and apparently replicable. In the course of experiments,
Janssen and Ahn [14] found that most players have other-
regarding preferences. They described the belief learning pro-
cess in which players take into account the potential benefit they
could have derived if they had made different choices.
Isaac et al. [12] made a classification of subject according to
their contribution behaviour. They differentiated five groups as
4 In a standard linear public goods game giving zero is the Nash equilibrium
but average contribution is about 60% of the initial endowment [9]
it seems below:
Tab. 1. Classification of contribution behaviour [Source: Isaac et al. (1984)]
Contribution (%) Title
0 Complete Free-Rider
0 - 35 Incomplete Free Riders
35 - 70 Weak Free-Riders
70 - 99 Incomplete Cooperators
100 Complete Cooperator
3.2 Percentage Experiment
The aim of this experiment is to point out whether a crowd-
ing out effect exists at the introduction of the percentage system
or not. The conditions of the experiment were chosen to simu-
late the situation with and without the possibility of percentage
philanthropy. Therefore, we have followed 5 rounds with the
original – only own contributions conditions – after introduc-
ing the new rules by the experimenter other 5 rounds with the
percentage system.
Through the experiment, each group consisted of 5 students
of economics between 18 and 22 years who had already fulfilled
microeconomic as an obligatory subject. The sessions were kept
in class environment – but only the participants were present:
one or two experimenter and 5 students. Discussions were not
allowed only after the exposition of the rules a short discussion
period happened. The experimenter communicated face to face
with the players but the results were recorded and calculated on
computer.
The experimenter collected the contributions and he was the
only person who knew the players’ offered amount but at the
end of each round the amount of public goods per person was
announced in public. The gender of students was only registered
no selection were made previously. Each group was mixed but
the gender profile was different: mainly 2 men and 3 women
groups were observed (6 group) but there was 3 groups of 3 men
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and 2 women and one group consisted of 1 men and 4 women.
All together 28 girls and 22 boys played in this series of game.
Each session lasted on average half an hour.
While a simple public good experiment could be played with
money [18] , with cards [18] [10] or anything else that could
symbolise money in this experiment I used virtual money –
credit – that also measured utility. To use this kind of currency
was not convincing for students because they are used to pay
with credit cards and they were all proprietary of a bank ac-
count, which could also behave as virtual money. In each round
players received 50 credits on their accounts but they could not
carry their earnings from one round to the other so each round
began with 50 credits for each student.
The first five rounds were played as a traditional public goods
game and it was necessary for students to study the process
of the experiment. In the next five rounds percentage system
was introduced. It complicated the process a little bit, but the
change in the game was not so complicated therefore the sub-
jects adapted easily. In this part of the experiment they were
able to contribute from their own property (50 credits) and des-
ignate another maximum 5 credits from their earlier paid tax –
as it was presented5. This proportion of percentage contribu-
tions (10%) is higher than percentages used in the reality but the
aim of the research was not to measure philanthropy but to get
an answer to the question whether there is a crowding out effect
or not.
After collecting contributions on a sheet of paper, the exper-
imenter records it in a computer so the data collected could
be analysed and the behaviour of players could be followed.
The division of contribution was made in proportion to num-
ber therefore after 1 credit contribution every player received
0,4 credit as public good which is the marginal per capita return.
It is an average MPCR, and although according to Ledyard [18]
6 the marginal payoff plays important role in the decision of the
given amount, this rate of return has no significant effect on it
[15].
Synthesis of a round:
1 Students choose the sum of contribution in mind and write it
on a piece of paper and into their result sheets.
2 Experimenter collects the piece of paper from each student,
3 summarises the contributions,
4 announces (the total and) per capita sum of public good.
5 Students calculate their earnings.
At the end of the 10 rounds, the students and the experimenter
calculate the total utilities of players through the game, discuss
5 See Appendix to the paper containing the description and rules received by
the students.
6In experiments observed by Ledyard [18] the marginal payoffs were be-
tween 0.16 and 0.75. Isaac, Walker, and Williams [13] examined MPCR be-
tween 0.03 and 0.3.
the results, and draw conclusions. Through the experiment the
aim was not covered so students give their decisions with the
goal of maximizing their utility. The utility function was the
following:
U= sum of private good + sum of public good
where:
Sum of private good = 50 – contribution
Sum of public good = the announced sum
The maximum possible utility per capita is 1050 if everybody
contributes all of his 50 credits in every round plus the possi-
ble 5 credits as a part of the percentage system in the last five
rounds. The minimum utility was 200 which could occur when
only one person is perfect contributor, but the other players con-
tribute zero through the game. The estimate was somewhere
between the two.
4 Results
At the aggregate level, average contribution over the 10 ses-
sions of the game was 18.38 which corresponds to 37% of social
optimum. It means “Weak Free-Riding behaviour” according to
Isaac et al. [12]. The maximum achieved utility was 939.2,
which was not achieved with complete free-rider behaviour, be-
cause the subject contributions from income were 5 credits in
each round and 2 or 3 from percentage system. The average
contribution from income in this game (no.7) was 111 credits
which is the highest among the 10 games. The lowest contribu-
tions appeared in the experiment no.6 were on the average 54.2
credits were given to the production of public goods in every
round.
There was only one complete free rider in the game no.2:
the student gave nothing from his income but from the percent-
age contributions he gave the maximum in the second part of
the experiment. His total utility took 790 credits, which was a
quite good result but not the “best” because his partners were not
too generous. Perhaps other-regarding behaviour with changing
contributions could be more efficient. There was no complete
co-operator.
Over time zero contribution from income occurred 47 times –
in 9.4% of decisions which is higher than in Hichri’s experiment
[9]. Complete cooperation (contributing all of the 50 credits)
happened in 15 round – 3% of the decisions. Looking at the
percentage system 3 times the possibility of percentage system
was not capitalised (but contribution from income was taken)
and 4 times occurred zero contribution in total. Together the
share of corner solutions is 13%.
The decrease in contributions could not be definitely ob-
served, as it shown in Fig. 4 where the average contributions
are represented for all the subjects and separately for men and
women through the 10 rounds. It is obvious that in the last
five rounds contributions are higher, because percentage system
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Fig. 4. Average contributions for men, women and all subjects
is involved in the total contributions and because contributing
more is less costly. The averages of individual and percentage
contributions are shown on Fig. 5.
Following the trend drawn by the individual contributions,
we find that in the first 3 rounds contributions increased then
decreased. By introducing the percentage system, the individ-
ually offered amount fluctuated through three rounds then the
decreasing trend appeared again. It could be said that by giving
people the opportunity to design some percentage from their tax
to the production of a public good turns the individual contribu-
tions from the declining trend but after a short learning period
(3 rounds) people continue to give less money in every round.
Taking into consideration Hichry’s result [9], that after 5 pe-
riods contributions are almost constant but his experiment lasted
25 rounds. We could find that the crowding out effect does not
appear significantly therefore this result corresponds with Kuti’s
statement [17] and partly contradicts to Andreoni [1] who found
that much of crowding out dued to the reduced fund raising of
nonprofits. However, this factor is not relevant when we observe
the introduction of the percentage system, because the maxi-
mum available donation is not significant financial resource for
the third sector. On the other hand we should bear in mind that
this experiment does not represent the whole society because
only young adults were involved, and the fact that they does not
make decisions over their own money may also influence the
result as a feature of experimental research.
The average individual contribution decreased by 2.1 credits
between the two parts of the experiment that is more than 12 per-
cent fall. It could be explained by the decreasing level of contri-
bution but the change in the environments could also cause this
symptom. On the other hand Rose-Ackerman [20] described
that government grants to charities need not reduce private do-
nations and may even lead to increased private giving. In this
case percentage donations could behave as private donations in
fact this kind of subsidy is given from central budget.
“End effects” were not noticeable when regarding total contri-
butions. Contributions are generally decreasing over time with
an “end effect” observed during the last periods and correspond-
ing to a clear decrease of contributions [9]. Only women’s con-
tributions decreased at the end of both parts of the experiment.
Moreover, at the end of the first five rounds the men’s level of
contribution increased and it effected that total contribution were
almost the same in the 4th and the 5th round.
Difference between men and women behaviour is significant
when crowding out effect is analysed. When observing Fig. 6
where the trends of average contribution are drawn it is appre-
ciable that in the first part of the experiment men’s contributions
were over women’s contributions except in the first period. Af-
ter getting the possibility to dispose 5 credits from tax men be-
haviour changed, they gave less than women except in the last
period. The conclusion is interesting: crowding out effect is
traceable when men’s decisions are analysed, but women’s de-
cisions counterweight this phenomena because they give more
from their income when the new system is introduced. How-
ever, the difference between them is diminishing by the progress
of time; on the average men’s contribution were 7.8% lower than
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Fig. 7. The average of the designated percentages in the last five rounds
women’s in the last five periods.
This result is contradictory to the results of Andreoni and
Vesterlund [3] when they observed how male and female de-
mands for altruism might differ. They found that when altru-
ism is expensive, women are kinder, but when it is cheap, men
are more altruistic. Nevertheless, on average the difference be-
tween men and women was not significant. In their experiment
mixed groups were created to avoid unwanted psychological in-
fluences, such as in-group effects to analyse male-female dif-
ference where they used a modification of the dictator game7.
Conlin, Donoghue and Lynn [5] were also found a similar result
to Andreoni when they analysed altruism in restaurant tipping.
As the bill got larger men’s percent-tips declined at a faster rate
than those of women.
Other conversion could be observed to Bergstrom’s and An-
dreoni’s [2] examination of the effects of government subsidies
on private supply of public goods. They found that if public
goods and private goods are both normal goods, then increases
in the subsidy rate necessarily increase the equilibrium supply
of public goods. In this experiment the utility function does
not make difference between public and private goods, and util-
ity increase with the growing amount of these goods. The two
products are perfect substitutes and there are no evidences that
these goods are not normal goods. Therefore, when more sub-
sidies are given the supply of public goods is increasing but the
change is smaller than the amount of the possible attainable sub-
sidy (5 credits).
Fig. 7 illustrates the average of percentage contributions made
by men, women and totally. It is interesting that there was only
one game (Nr.10) where all subjects contributed the maximum
7 In dictator games subjects decide how to allocate a fixed payoff between
them and other subjects, over a series of different payoffs and different relative
prices.
in every period. At the end of the games subjects said that their
motivation was to maximise their utility in the group (to be the
most effective) and therefore they did not designate the maxi-
mum possible amount because they did not want others to get
“extra” money. On the other hand, they changed the level of
percentage contributions to try out what happened when they
changed their percentage contributions.
Hence at the beginning they were cautious then they increased
their percentage contributions that achieved an average of 4.7
credits in the third round which is 94% of the maximum possi-
ble contribution. By the end of the game, the percentage contri-
butions decreased faster (7%) than the contributions made from
income (3%) in total so the “end effect” was stronger in this
case. Looking at the difference between genders we could ob-
serve that both the maximum and minimum of percentage con-
tributions were achieved by the group of men.
5 Conclusion
By introducing the percentage systems one of the govern-
ments’ aims was to help the actors of the third sector in fundrais-
ing. This aim was partially realised because the amount re-
ceived from this source is under 1% of nonprofits’ annual in-
come but apart from the average there are several civil organi-
sations whose situation ameliorated by this policy. On the other
hand, while empirical evidences show the possibility of a crowd-
ing out effect experimental results demonstrate that this effect is
not significant when the whole society is observed.
Nevertheless, when men and women are differentiated in ex-
perimental research it is apparent that the behaviour of the two
genders is different. By introducing the percentage system, men
give less money than before, but women contribute more. The
willingness of the two genders to dispose some percentage from
their tax to NGOs does not differ remarkably in longer term. To
support this statement further empirical research is required.
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Appendix
5.1 Experimental Economics – Public Goods Game
The aim of this game is to observe how the private contribu-
tion to public goods works. The subjects are the students pre-
sented in classroom.
5.2 The Synthesis of the Game
1 Everybody has virtually 50 credits virtually (as bank ac-
count). As an actor of the economy, you could spend it on pri-
vate goods or could offer it to the production of public goods.
Every credit offered to public good production is supported
by the State, so the State duplicates the sum from the tax rev-
enue that is financed from the earlier paid taxes (50 credits
per person).
In every round (5 rounds) everybody had to decide how much
he/she would contribute to the production of public goods.
Then write on a piece of paper his or her given code (A, B, C,
D or E) and the sum of contribution as it shown on Fig. 8:(A, B, C, D or E) and the sum of contribution as it shown below: 
 
 
 
After creating this sheet, everybody could write the same sum on his/her own result 
 
A  
…. credit 
Fig. 8.
After creating this sheet, everybody could write the same sum
on his/her own result sheet while the leader of the experiment
collect the contribution’s papers. As the end of the round, the
executive calculate the quantity of public goods multiplies it
and compute the sum per person; than announce it. Accord-
ing to the given quantity of the public good, players could
determine their own utility as it shown:
U= sum of private good + sum of public good
where:
Sum of private good = 50 – contribution
Sum of public good = the announced sum
2 In the next 5 round, the exercise is a little bit complicated.
Players have to take two decisions at the same time. The first
exercise is the same as in the first experiment: contributing
0-50 credits to the public good production. The second exer-
cise is to define that from his earlier paid tax (50 credits) how
much he/she would determine to the public good production.
The maximum scale is 5 credits (10% of the paid tax). From
the state’s perspective the process is the same: duplicate both
kinds of contributions. In this case the papers to be collected
look like Fig. 9:
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1. the papers to be collected look like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D  
…. credit 
… tax 
Fig. 9.
The utility function here is the same:
U= sum of private good + sum of public good
where:
Sum of private good = 50 – contribution
Sum of public good = the announced sum
The only difference is in the calculation of the sum of pub-
lic good, where the leader of the experiment adds together the
two kinds of contributions for each player then multiplies them,
and calculates the sum per person. The round closes with the
announcement of the quantity of the public good.
5.3 Results
Player’s code:
Tab. 2. Experiment
x y = 50-x z w = y + z
round contribution private good public good personal utility
1
2
3
4
5
Tab. 3. Experiment
x t y = 50-x z w = y + z
round contribution contribution from tax private good public good personal utility
1
2
3
4
5
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